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BOOK REVIEW
DEFENSIBLE SPACE.

By Oscar Newman. New York: MacMillan. 1970.

Pp. 264. $8.95.
Crime is a problem. Politicians campaign with slogans about
"crime in the streets" and "law and order," but one seldom reads of
any proposals of practical ways to reduce crime. It was a relief, therefore, to read Oscar Newman's book, Defensible Space; his book is the
first book on crime prevention that I have read in recent years to offer
specific, concrete proposals that are both politically possible and
humanistically inspired.
Newman states a hypothesis-the design of a housing unit and its
immediate environment is causally linked to crime-and he offers
evidence in support of the hypothesis. Furthermore, he is specific; the
recommendations that are the result of his study can be used as
guidelines by architects. He has proposals for designing new buildings
and remodeling old buildings that he argues will lead to a reduction
in crime.
I suppose that you are curious about how anyone could conduct a
study that could prove such a thing. He did it by studying the New
York City Housing Authority, and he makes the claim that it is "an
incomparable laboratory for measuring the effect of different housing
environments on crime and vandalism" (p. xiv). If one looks at what
he says about the housing run by this Authority, his data base, it does
seem to live up to his claim that it is an "incomparable laboratory."
There is first of all the rather remarkable fact that 19% of all of the
public housing in the country is run by this one authority (p. 10). The
authority has 169 housing projects which contain 150,000 individual
residential units and 528,000 residents (p. xiv). The authority has
elaborate data about just who its tenants are; it has data on such
things as age, income, years of residence, and history of family pathology (p. xiv). The author's conclusion about this part of his data is
that throughout the projects studied there is "only a limited variation
in the social characteristics of resident population" (p. xv). Thus, one
of the variables that is often linked to crime, social characteristics,
is uniform throughout the data base.
Another variable that is often linked to crime is location; some
parts of a city are more dangerous and have more crime than others.
Here again, the sheer size of this particular housing authority makes
it possible to control this variable. First, the projects are spread
throughout the greater New York area, some in high crime areas and
some in low. Second, the physical characteristics of the housing projects often differ from those of the neighborhood in which it is located.
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There are high-rise, high-density projects 20 miles from central Manhattan in the midst of single-family residential areas; there are lowdensity projects in central Manhattan (p. xv). Thus, this variable can
be analyzed; one can compare whether location is more significant
than design.
As to the variable that Newman is interested in, the design of
buildings and projects, there is all the variety that one could wish for.
The range of building types, for example, goes from 2-story row
houses to 30-story elevator apartments (p. xiv). Indeed, as I read the
book, I was surprised at the variety of this variable; I would have
thought that a bureaucracy would have turned out a more uniform
product.
What then are the conclusions that Newman reaches? How are
the variables correlated? It turns out that the most significant correlation is the height of the buildings in the projects (pp. 27-28). The
taller the buildings, the higher the crime rate. For projects with
buildings that are six stories or less, the size of the project does not
make much difference. However, if the project is made up primarily
of large buildings, then the statistics do show that large buildings in
large projects have more crime than large buildings in small projects.
It would be possible for me to set out the statistics in further
detail, but I suppose that most people who will read this review are
not very good at statistics and find them hard to fathom. Therefore,
I would like to set out one example. There are two housing projects
in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn that are right across the street
from each other; they are known as the Brownsville project and the
Van Dyke project. Both house about 6,000 people at a density of 288
people per acre. The social statistics such as family size, income,
race, percentage of broken families, age distribution, and turnover
rate are substantially the same for both projects. However, the building types are very different. The buildings in the Brownsville project
are all 3 to 6 story buildings; these buildings occupy 23% of the land.
In the Van Dyke project, the buildings occupy only 16.6% of the land
and, consequently, in order to get the same number of people at the
same density of people per acre, the buildings in Van Dyke have to
be larger. Van Dyke does have some smaller buildings; to be precise,
there are nine 3-story buildings. However, 87% of the residential units
in Van Dyke are in thirteen 14-story buildings. As you might have
guessed, the Van Dyke project has substantially more crime; 60%
more felonies, 264% more robberies (pp. 39-49).
One of the most remarkable lessons to be drawn from Newman's
statistics is that the phrase "crime in the streets" is a misnomer. The
buildings themselves are far more dangerous. To demonstrate this,
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let us divide all projects in New York City into three areas: the
apartment unit, which is a private place; the interior public places
such as lobbies, elevators, stairs, roofs, etc.; and the exterior public
places, i.e., the grounds. Then let us take a crime index of felonies
per thousand inhabitants and distribute these felonies among the
three areas. By my calculations, the following chart is the result (pp.
32-33).
Number of
stories in
Felonies per
building
thousand
Apartment Interior Public Grounds
3
6 &7
13 & over

9
12
20

3.6
4.2
4.0

1.6
4.8
11.0

3.8
3.0
5.0

If you examine the chart, you can notice how the crime index increases from 9 to 20 as one goes from the small buildings to the largest
buildings. Note that one gets only a small increase of crime in apartments, but there is a fantastic increase from 1.6 to 11.0 for the interior
public places.
The obvious next question is, Why? Why are large buildings unsafe? So far, I have presented only statistics, and everyone knows that
statistics show only correlations. The facts of correlations tell us us
nothing about causation; we want to know the cause. Our desire for
causal knowledge is not based merely on our desire for scientific
accuracy; we need accurate causal knowledge if we are going to be
able to take remedial action. For example, is the only way to reduce
crime to tear down the big buildings and put up small ones? Is there
something about big buildings that causes crime and that we can
change? If our causal knowledge is precise enough to let us answer
the second question with a Yes, then we would probably choose building modification over building destruction on the grounds that modification would be less disruptive, both economically and socially.
Newman is able to offer causal explanations; for example, he is
able to explain the fact that I have just discussed: the dangerousness
of interior public spaces in large buildings. As a preliminary matter
we must remember that public housing apartment buildings do not
have doormen; anyone can walk in the door and ride up the elevator.
Indeed it is this very fact that led us to characterize them as interior
public spaces. Yet even though they are public, they are not under
the same sort of public observation as streets and their sidewalks are.
Furthermore, fire regulations require a particular number of stairwells and exits, and certain configurations of stairwells and exits have
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become common. There is no way that I can give an adequate description of the architectural details; the reader must consult Newman's book (pp. 34-35). However, I can state the result of the architecture; the stairwells and exits connect so as to make a maze in
which a criminal can hide, from which he can suddenly sally forth
and attack, and to which he can return for escape. Pursuit of a criminal through this maze by a policeman is impossible; in order to seal
off a building a squad would be required. Later on in this review, I
shall return to the issue of why it is correct to say that this sort of
explanation is a causal explanation. For now, let us continue with
what Newman has to say.
Newman offers us two lists; one describes an unsafe project, and
the other describes a safe project. There is an interesting difference
between the two lists. The charactistics of the unsafe projects are
given by physical description, and it is apparently a composite picture of existing unsafe projects. Unsafe projects are large, with more
than a thousand families; the buildings in the project are towers (slab
or cruciform) of more than seven stories that house 150 to 500 families; the site is an assembly of 4 to 6 blocks into a superblock with no
interior traffic; the buildings are positioned on the site in a free compositional pattern; the grounds are designed as one continuous space,
open to the street (p. 22).
* The list for safe projects is more general. It is not a direct descrip-tion, it is indirect-in that principles are given that can be used to
generate different designs and provide a choice among them. The
general principle is that the architect must create a hierarchy of zones
from public, through semi-public and semi-private to private, and
that the boundaries between these zones must be marked by symbolic
-(not real) barriers. This -'territorially defined space must have the
following characteristics: an .intruder must be able to read- the symbols thatdefine the boundaries of the zones; inhabitants must be able
to have surveillance over the boundaries; the space must require an
intruder to declare his intentions; the inhabitants.must be able to
challenge the intruder (pp. 63-64).
This last paragraph is probably meaningless to you; the language
is both general and metaphorical, and so there is no way thatyou can
understand how an architect'is supposed to use this language to help
him design hofising projects. Let me use a simple example that is
removed from the sort of problem that Newman is speaking to but
that may illustrate some of his concepts. Suppose that you live in a
suburb, that you have a front yard that is level with the street, and
that you are unhappy with the way that your neighbors are using your
front yard. For example, there are very few cars on the street and so
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that street is used for playing ball; part of your yard has become part
of the playing field. A Newman-like analysis would point out that the
street was clearly a public place, your front-stoop was clearly a private place, your front-stoop was clearly marked as a private place,
but the space in between is ambiguous. After all, there is a right of
way that is broader than the asphalt of the street and that does
belong to the public, but where does it end? A symbolic boundary
would be privet hedge; it would not keep out anyone who would wish
to come in, but if you put in a hedge, the use of your front yard by
others would be lessened.
The problems of a city, however, are very different from the problems of suburbia, so my example does not provide the key to the book.
A better example is a walk-up apartment building that runs the
length of a city-block, facing the street. It could have a central corridor on each floor running the length of the building; individual apartment units would open onto the corridor. A different method of construction would be to have a set of stair-wells with the individual
apartment units clustering around and opening upon the stair-wells.
In other words, the choice is between building the unit with an integrated and basically horizontal interior traffic pattern as opposed to
building it with a series of disconnected and basically vertical interior
traffic patterns. The latter way of building is safer (pp. 71-77). Why?
There is no lack of a symbolic barrier in either case; the passage from
the public space of the street to the semi-public space of the corridor
or stair-well is clearly marked by an unambiguous symbol (a door)
under either building technique. The real difference is that the
requirements of surveillance and the ability to challenge are met in
the stair-well method but are not met in the corridor system. There
is no mystery as to this. A stair-well in a walk-up will probably serve
twelve families at the most. Consequently, the inhabitants are able
to identify anyone who is on the stairs as either a resident or an
intruder. This sort of recognition is not possible if there is a long
corridor. Lack of knowledge results in an inability to challenge; consequently, the corridor does not receive surveillance but becomes a
no-man's land.
The bulk of the book is the exploration of details such as this last
one. If you are interested in the details, read the book. As a practical
matter, you need not be an architect or property manager to be interested in the details. If you ever hunt for an apartment in a big city,
there is a good deal of information in the book that can equip you to
make judgments as to relative safety of different apartments. One
more example must suffice. The building entry should face the street
and not the interior of the project. If the entry faces the street, then
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you can give surveillance to the street when you leave, and when you
return you can see the entrance from the street. In either case, you
can know whether there is any danger ahead of you. An added bonus
is that the police can give surveillance to the entrance from the street
(pp. 80-82).
As one reads the details of the book and inspects the diagrams and
photographs, it all seems so obvious. Why then do we not build the
way Newman thinks we should? If we look at the history of architecture, it turns out that generally speaking, we always have built that
way (pp. 4-7). Territorial definition and symbolization have been the
ordinary motifs of city architecture; it has been only in recent years
that we have built housing for the poor (and sometimes for the middle
class) that has lacked these features. Why? Newman gives several
reasons. The sort of knowledge that has guided our building in the
past was "not held within the conscious verbal bank of human knowledge." When building design becomes the product of schools and
bureaucracies, this sort of knowledge can become easily lost. The
architects who have designed the buildings that Newman criticizes
are partially at fault. Some of the dangerous features appear to be
nothing more than the product of aesthetic whim (p. 12). This would
seem to be a violation of the architectural profession's primary
maxim-form follows function. In other words, the social functions
of buildings have not been carefully enough examined by the profession. A rather more significant cause is cost. The most dangerous type
of building is the high-rise, elevator-serviced building. Inflated land
costs have led to building at higher densities, and once the density
of 75 apartment units per acre is reached, then the high-rise slab
becomes the only option, unless one makes a fairly radical change in
building design (pp. 25-26).
Granting all of the above, we still do not have an explanation.
After all, the book is primarily an examination of public housing.
Could not the government have absorbed some of the cost and built
safer buildings? Aside from and in addition to ignorance, the particular dynamics of public housing is significant. Generally speaking, the
largest public housing projects have been a by-product of urban renewal. In urban renewal, the ghettos were cleared to make room for
businesses and for middle-income housing. There was then a need for
replacement housing, but there was not much space that was available. Typically, an out-of-the-way portion of the cleared land near
the existing ghettos was used to build housing at five to ten times the
density of the old ghetto (pp. 36-37). The result was high-rises. Newman's account of these dynamics contains one particularly depressing
sentence: "placing federally sponsored housing of high-density on
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urban renewal land insured that a higher price per acre could be paid
by a city's housing agency to a city's urban renewal agency" (p. 37).
I would like to return to an issue that I discussed earlier in this
review-the problem of causation. In the human sciences (sociology,
psychology, etc.), we want proof of causation and not proof of correlations. Newman observes the distinction; he does not theorize about
it. I would like to theorize a bit, to talk about what counts for causal
explanation in the human sciences as opposed to the physical sciences. I would like to argue that the environment, whether physical
or social, causes (or "influences") our actions whenever we give a
symbolic reading to the environment. Newman's account of the impact of building design illustrates this thesis. Unfortunately, it is
hard to demonstrate this in a review, since one cannot follow the
details of his argument without looking at his diagrams and photographs. Of course, it is not practical to reproduce them in this review,
and word descriptions of the relevant architectural details would not
convey much to a reader who is not familiar with architectural vocabulary. However, I can quote a passage from his discussion of playgrounds that I think anyone can visualize. The issue is whether recreational space should somehow be enclosed.
Studies of the use of grounds of housing projects in many different cities-New York, Cleveland, San Francisco-indicate
that the grounds of projects which were intentionally left open
for public use (as a contribution to the open-space needs of the
surrounding city) end up unused and neglected, by housing
residents as well as members of the surrounding community.
Each group, by experience, has found their activities easily
disrupted by other groups and found that their claim to the use
of space for recreation difficult to enforce. By contrast, recreation space located within the interior of a housing project,
clearly defined by surrounding dwellings, was found to be used
more frequently by both groups. Project residents had clearly
laid claim to these play spaces and set up an unwritten, but
understood, set of rules for their use. These rules were enforced
by parents and other children. Project residents had first claim
to this use, followed by surrounding neighborhood children,
who came both spontaneously and by invitation. Disputes
almost always resulted in the expulsion of the visitors (p. 205).
Note how the causation works in the playground example. The
non-enclosed playground is not used by anybody. The enclosed playground is used by both the inhabitants of the project and by visitors.
The change in the physical structures appears to be a necessary condition. Note further what the problems are. Use of a particular piece
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of terrain for baseball means that it cannot be simultaneously used
to play tag. If both or either or these games is to be played, there must
be some rule or convention as to the allocation of the terrain to a use,
or else someone must be strong enough to appropriate the terrain. In
the unenclosed playground, it appears that no one has either the
power to appropriate or the authority to make rules. When the playground is enclosed, the situation is changed. One of three things must
have happened: the balance of power changed; authority became
recognized because of the symbolization of an enclosure; or some
combination of these occurred. The first hypothesis, a change in the
balance of power, is untenable. If I read Newman correctly, the type
of enclosure of which he speaks is not accomplished by locked gates
and guards; consequently, if the outsiders had the physical power to
disrupt before enclosure, they would still have so after. There would
still be entries into the enclosure which the outsiders could use. Furthermore, Newman asserts that "an unwritten, but understood, set
of rules" were generated, albeit by some process of which we are
ignorant. One plausible hypothesis is that the fact of enclosure gave
the residents of the project the confidence to assert control and intimidated the outsiders into accepting control. Such words as "confidence" and "intimidated" refer to mental states, so the hypothesis
suggests that the topic for investigation is the link between the environment's physical shape and the inhabitants' mental state. The link
might be physiological or biological; however, Newman's hypothesis,
which is both plausible and worth investigating, is that the link is
symbolic, i.e., people read certain physical shapes as having meanings which they understand and which thus influence their mental
state via this route of meaning and understanding.
I would like to close this review by commenting on a rather curious
passage from Newman's book. It is not what he says that is curious,
for what he says is perfectly reasonable; what is curious is that he
would feel the need to say it.
The essential ingredient of our proposal is territorial definition coupled with improvements to the capacity of the territorial occupants to survey their newly defined realm. Territorial definition may appear to be the antithesis of the open
society, and surveillance a further restriction on its freedom.
Territory and surveillance have after all traditionally been
understood as the devices of the propertied classes and their
agents or police authority. We, however, are advocating territorial definition and the creation of surveillance opportunities
to allow the citizen of the open society to achieve control of his
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environment for the activities he wishes to pursue within it-to
make him instrumental in curtailing others from destroying
his habitat (p. 204).
I gather that Newman fears that he will be charged with advocating something inimical to democracy and freedom by his advocacy
of territory and surveillance. Such a charge would seem so bizarre
that I at first wondered why he would enter such an anticipatory
defense. Alas, I fear that he may be right; the low quality of our
current political debate probably makes his defense necessary, those
against whom he is defending himself use words in an abstract way;
in particular, the key words of a theory of democracy, "public" and
"private," are subject to this corruption. People forget that these
terms are polar terms; without one the other does not exist. This pair
of terms is like "right" and "left" or "up" and "down"; you can't give
one member of the pair a meaning without also giving the other pair
a meaning. The public thing, the res publica, the republic, is something in which everyone must have a stake; if no one cares about it,
then it ceases to exist. Similarly, if one cares about what happens in
playgrounds and on staircases, then someone must care; someone
must be given a stake. The innovative and encouraging thesis of
Newman is that one can create a private stake in things without
creating a private legal title in them; architectural design that has
the right symbolic meaning is enough.
I also suspect that the critic against which Newman is striving to
erect his anticipatory defense would suffer from another confusion.
Newman wishes to organize space into a hierarchy of uses so that
rules for the use of these articulated spaces can be generated by the
community. There are those who view a hierarchy of rules as inimical
to freedom. The best refutation of such a view is the description of
grounds and lobbies of public housing projects, where space is not
organized, but uniform. It would be hard to defend such bleak landscapes as a realm of freedom. The point that is often forgotten is that
freedom requires variety and variety requires order. I mean this last
sentence as a strictly logical point. One must remember that there is
only one way to be random. By definition, a random space is a space
for which one area is not distinguishable from another. A random
space (just like a vacuum) is perfectly uniform, without order. Variety requires order. The only sensible question is: what variety of
orders do we want?
LEwIs H. LARUE*
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, School of
Law.
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